1672-8505

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YU Li-e. Study on the Tripartite Game of Government, Investors and Officials under High Pressure of Anti-corruptionJ. Journal of Xihua University (Philosophy & Social Sciences) , 2018, 37(5): 55-60. DOI: 10.19642/j.issn.1672-8505.2018.05.008
Citation: YU Li-e. Study on the Tripartite Game of Government, Investors and Officials under High Pressure of Anti-corruptionJ. Journal of Xihua University (Philosophy & Social Sciences) , 2018, 37(5): 55-60. DOI: 10.19642/j.issn.1672-8505.2018.05.008

Study on the Tripartite Game of Government, Investors and Officials under High Pressure of Anti-corruption

  • On the basis of the game theory, this paper builds the tripartite game model of government, investors and officials based on building the game models of investors and officials, government and investors, government and officials. It gives suggestions for reducing the probabilities of investors bribing officials and officials taking bribes by analyzing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The results show that the probabilities of investors bribing officials and officials taking bribes are affected by the ability of government finding out bribery between investors and officials, government's cost of anti-corruption, punishments for investors and officials, etc.Thus, using information means to improve government's ability to identify bribery between investors and officials, reduce government's anti-corruption costs, and increase penalties for investors' bribery and officials' bribery can effectively improve the government's anti-corruption efficiency.
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